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block-wildcard-agent-permissions

v0.0.1

by open-coder-ai · author: chock-core

block-wildcard-agent-permissions is an Agent Plugin published by open-coder-ai that packages 1 skill and no MCP servers for ChatGPT, Codex, Cursor, GitHub Copilot, VS Code, and Kiro. Verified against the official Agent Plugins 1.0.0 schema on 2026-08-18; Apache-2.0 licensed; 1 stars on the host repository.

Pre-commit gate for the mechanizable slice of excessive agency: committed agent permission grants that allow everything. A settings file whose shell grant or allow-list is a bare wildcard hands the agent unlimited tool authority for every future session, in a file reviewers rarely read as code. The agent-world twin of block-wildcard-iam: scope grants to what the task needs (e.g. Bash(git status:*)). Escape: 'pragma: allowlist broad-agency' on the same line.

Skills
1
MCP servers
0
Stars
1
License
Apache-2.0

Links

Skills · 1

  • block-wildcard-agent-permissions

Category

Security & Compliance — assigned by this directory, not declared in the manifest.

Keywords

chock · policy-as-code · hook · block · {'control': 'asi03' · 'coverage': 'partial' · 'note': 'blocks the everything-grant a diff can show (llm03 excessive agency); least-agency tool design remains advisory (owasp-asi02-tool-misuse · owasp-asi03-identity-privilege-abuse)'}

Related plugins

  • block-wildcard-iamopen-coder-ai

    Pre-commit gate for the mechanizable slice of ASI03: wildcard Action or Resource in IAM policy documents, AdministratorAccess attachment, GCP roles/owner or roles/editor, and Terraform wildcard action/resource lists. An agent's identity design stays with the advisory owasp-asi03 policy; this blocks the grants whose blast radius is everything. Escape: 'pragma: allowlist broad-privilege' on the same line.

  • Pre-commit gate for the mechanizable slice of prompt-injection defense: invisible and direction-override Unicode in staged changes. Bidi controls make code read differently than it parses (Trojan Source, CVE-2021-42574); Unicode tag-block characters smuggle instructions that are invisible to a human reviewer but fully legible to the agent reading the file. Zero-width joiners and bidi marks (ZWJ/ZWNJ/LRM/RLM) are deliberately NOT matched -- they are legitimate in emoji sequences and in Persian, Arabic and Indic text -- so ordinary internationalised content passes; only the override/embed/isolate controls and the tag block, which have no honest use in a source tree, are blocked. Escape: 'pragma: allowlist invisible-unicode' on the same line.

  • Pre-commit gate for the mechanizable slice of ASI04: agent components pulled at an unpinned version. Blocks npx/uvx/bunx launches at @latest — the standard MCP server idiom — quoted "@latest" arguments in agent config, and :latest container images. Language-manifest dependencies are verify-dependency-exists; signature and provenance stay with the advisory owasp-asi04 policy. Escape: 'pragma: allowlist unpinned' on the same line.

  • Pre-commit gate for the mechanizable slice of ASI05: bare eval/exec, shell-mode subprocess calls, os.system, pickle/marshal loads, yaml.load without SafeLoader, execSync, new Function. Best-effort line scan; sandbox design, egress, and inherited credentials stay with the advisory owasp-asi05 policy. Escape hatch for vetted uses: 'pragma: allowlist exec' on the same line.

  • Guard against an agent hand-editing its own guardrails. Agent instruction files (AGENTS.md and the per-agent wrappers), permission files (.claude/settings.json, .mcp.json) and vendored enforcement (.chock/bin/, .chock/compiled/) define what the agent may do -- so a shell command that rewrites them is the agent modifying its own authority (MITRE ATLAS AML.T0081; the AIVSS self-modification factor). The guard refuses shell write-commands targeting those paths; reads pass, and regeneration through `chock sync` passes because the tool writes them itself rather than through shell editing. Best-effort and deliberately coarse: a compound command that both reads a protected file and writes elsewhere may be refused -- rewrite it in two steps. Escape for a human-approved change: include 'chock: approved-config-change' in the command.

  • protect-main-branchopen-coder-ai

    Block direct commits and pushes to main or master. Enforced at commit time by reading the current branch, and at push time by parsing the refs the agent is pushing.

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Verified : manifest fetched from GitHub and checked against the official Agent Plugins 1.0.0 schema (agent-plugins.org).