owasp-asi01-agent-goal-hijack

Links

• github.com/open-coder-ai/chock-catalog
• agentic-security/owasp-asi01-agent-goal-hijack/plugin.json (manifest)

Skills · 1

• owasp-asi01-agent-goal-hijack

Category

Security & Compliance — assigned by this directory, not declared in the manifest.

Keywords

chock · policy-as-code · rule · advise · asi01

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