protect-agent-config

Links

• github.com/open-coder-ai/chock
• .agents/policies/protect-agent-config/plugin.json (manifest)

Skills · 1

• protect-agent-config

Category

Security & Compliance — assigned by this directory, not declared in the manifest.

Keywords

chock · policy-as-code · rule · advise · {'control': 'asi03' · 'coverage': 'partial' · 'note': 'blocks shell self-modification of agent permission and instruction files; identity design and grant scoping remain advisory'}

Related plugins

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• protect-commit-privacyopen-coder-ai

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• agent-disciplineopen-coder-ai

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• block-no-verifyopen-coder-ai

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• block-wildcard-iamopen-coder-ai

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