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owasp-asi03-identity-privilege-abuse

v0.0.2

by open-coder-ai · author: chock-core

owasp-asi03-identity-privilege-abuse is an Agent Plugin published by open-coder-ai. It packages 1 skill. We fetched the plugin.json from GitHub on 2026-11-13 and checked it against the official Agent Plugins 1.0.0 schema.

Give each agent its own scoped, short-lived identity so a compromise does not inherit a human's or a shared account's full permissions. Use when an agent needs credentials, a service account, a cloud role, an API token, or when reviewing delegation and impersonation between an agent and its user. Do NOT use for keeping secrets out of the repository, that is `code-safety` and `scan-secrets`.

Package we checked

The manifest we fetched is agentic-security/owasp-asi03-identity-privilege-abuse/plugin.json in open-coder-ai/chock-catalog. The plugin root is the directory that holds that file. Its $schema is https://agent-plugins.org/schemas/1.0.0/plugin.schema.json. The manifest lists 1 skill (owasp-asi03-identity-privilege-abuse) and no MCP servers. Extension keys: io.github.open-coder-ai.

Skills
1
MCP servers
0
Stars
3
License
Apache-2.0
Repo created
2026-08-17
Last pushed
2026-11-12
Publisher type
Organization
Version
0.0.2

Links

Skills · 1

owasp-asi03-identity-privilege-abuse
Give each agent its own scoped, short-lived identity so a compromise does not inherit a human's or a shared account's full permissions. Use when an agent needs credentials, a service account, a cloud role, an API token, or when reviewing delegation and impersonation between an agent and its user. D…

Descriptions come from the frontmatter of each SKILL.md, punctuation lightly normalized.

Category

Security & Compliance. Assigned by this directory. Agent Plugins 1.0.0 has no category field, so no manifest declares one.

Keywords

chock · policy-as-code · rule · advise · asi03

Related by publisher and keywords

  • Guard against an agent hand-editing its own guardrails. Agent instruction files (AGENTS.md and the per-agent wrappers), permission files (.claude/settings.json,.mcp.json), the dependency allowlist (.chock/dependency-allowlist.txt) and vendored enforcement (.chock/bin/,.chock/compiled/) define what the agent may do, so a shell command that rewrites them is the agent modifying its own authority (MITRE ATLAS AML.T0081). The guard refuses shell writes to those paths, a redirect, rm/mv/tee/sed -i, cp into the path, git checkout/restore, PowerShell Set-Content/Add-Content/Out-File; reads and copies out pass, and `chock sync` passes. Best-effort and deliberately coarse. The 'chock: approved-config-change' marker is friction plus an audit trail, not authentication. A second, tool_use-only gate refuses Edit/Write to the same paths; it never runs at commit, so a person stays free to edit them.

  • Best effort, ask only. Asks a person before a shell command switches the identity later commands act as: aws --profile, AWS_PROFILE= or AWS keys (also $env:), sts assume-role, configure set of a key; gcloud account, configuration, login or impersonation; az account set, az login as a principal or identity; kubectl use-context or set-credentials; writes to ~/.aws, ~/.config/gcloud, ~/.azure. Names in.chock/credential-allowlist.json pass. Misses: scripts, SDKs, env files, credential_process.

  • Best-effort guard against shell commands that publish or keep access after the session: npm/pnpm/yarn/twine/ poetry/uv/cargo/gem publish, docker/podman push and login, npm token and registry edits, repos made public; user services, launch agents, cron/at/schtasks, Run keys, authorized_keys, runner registration, sudoers, setuid bits, detached downloads. Asks on gh release create, git remote add, git push to a URL. Misses: scripts, aliases, system units, shell rc files, ssh-run commands.

  • Best-effort guard against an agent reading credentials from the shell: cat, cp, tar, source or < on ~/.ssh (not.pub), ~/.aws, ~/.npmrc, agent CLI dirs, browser DBs, wallets,.env, *.tfstate; interpreter one-liners naming them; token printers (gh auth token, aws sts); curl, wget or iwr to cloud metadata credential paths (169.254.169.254, 169.254.170.2, GCE). Asks on env dumps. Misses: scripts, unresolved variables, xargs lists, $(...) results, metadata reached by DNS name, proxy or SDK.

  • agent-disciplineopen-coder-ai

    trigger: edits without reading, unverified completion claims, weakened tests, dead code. avoid: skipping verification, deleting assertions, leaving unused code.

  • Best-effort guard against destructive commands, read as parsed commands (bash -c and cd chains included, echo excluded): rm -rf on absolute, home ($HOME/~) or root-adjacent paths (and PowerShell Remove-Item -Recurse); git push --force (not --force-with-lease), reset --hard, clean -f; kubectl delete; terraform destroy; aws s3 rm --recursive / rb --force; dropdb; helm uninstall/delete; docker volume rm/prune and system prune; gcloud... delete; find -delete / -exec rm; shred; truncate; wipefs -a. git branch -D asks first. Verbs are matched position-aware, so a bucket or object NAMED like a verb is allowed, and a relative path in the working tree stays allowed. sudo, doas and pkexec are transparent. A pre-push hook refuses any non-fast-forward push, force, +refspec or lease alike; a human escapes with git push --no-verify. Known bypasses: aliases, an unusual value-flag, interpreters and scripts. Friction, not a security boundary.

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✓ Verified . We fetched the manifest from GitHub and checked it against the official Agent Plugins 1.0.0 schema at agent-plugins.org.