owasp-asi07-insecure-inter-agent-communication

Links

• github.com/open-coder-ai/chock-catalog
• agentic-security/owasp-asi07-insecure-inter-agent-communication/plugin.json (manifest)

Skills · 1

• owasp-asi07-insecure-inter-agent-communication

Category

Security & Compliance — assigned by this directory, not declared in the manifest.

Keywords

chock · policy-as-code · rule · advise · asi07

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